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ARE MMMFS MONEY?
JEFF HAYMOND
Two decades have passed since the Federal Reserve instituted the“monetarist” experiment. This attempt to implement Fed policy basedon quantity theory prescriptions was flawed almost from the begin-
ning,1 with one monetary aggregate after another being tried and eventually
discarded. The Lucas critique was in effect, and, with changing technological
innovation, exactly what was “money” became more and more difficult to
define. The Fed thereafter resumed targeting the Fed Funds Rate and de-em-
phasized monetary aggregates. Monetarism as a theory was widely discred-
ited, at least in a practical sense for public policy.
Changing monetary instruments and institutions may affect other theories
as well. The central core of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) suggests
that monetary expansion is responsible for the boom-and-bust business cycle
(Mises 1981, pp. 403–04). But what measure do we use to determine whether
we have a monetary expansion? Differing Austrian examinations of business
cycles have used slightly different definitions of money, for each investiga-
tion,2 but central to each is the role of fiduciary media, which traditionally are
expanded when the central bank increases reserves. Previous investigations
have limited the fiduciary media in question to checkable deposits (and
notes when legal for banks to issue). But as institutions change and financial
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thanks Bryan Caplan for crucial insights on the topic as well as Pete Boettke and an anony-
mous referee for specific comments. As usual, all remaining mistakes are his.
1Milton Friedman claimed that the policy followed was anything but monetarist, as
monthly money supply figures were highly variable—exactly opposite of a monetarist ap-
proach. The Fed, for its part, acknowledged the lack of precision in hitting targets, but
claimed it was doing its best, given changing money demand functions.
2Rothbard was widely criticized (wrongly, in my view) for including the cash surren-
der value of life insurance policies in his definition of money in America’s Great Depression .
Recently, Hughes (1997) simply used M2 in his analysis.
innovation increases, is this the only form of fiduciary media that Austrians
should consider in their views on business cycles? This article will specifically
examine the question of whether money market mutual funds (MMMFs) are
fiduciary media in a Misesian sense. If MMMFs are considered money, for
instance, who creates them? Are there any direct limitations on their creation
via Federal Reserve action? If not, how are these monies affected by Fed
policy? And if MMMFs are money, are there nonbank sources of inflationary
credit that can initiate a business cycle? This article will argue that, in the
economically relevant way, MMMFs are money, and while nonbanks cannot
initiate a credit expansion, their ability to expand their balance sheets should be
a relevant factor for Austrian analysis.
 For Austrians as well as most economists, there is little debate as to the
“moneyness” of fiat currency or checkable deposits; yet the question of
MMMFs offers the possibility of a fruitful debate. Consequently, while this
article will not assess whether each particular asset is money, the principles
developed will apply when assessing any monetary instrument. The other
main reason for focusing on MMMFs, and the nonbank intermediaries that
issue them is simply the tremendous increase in the number of MMMFs, in the
1990s. This is contrary to the approach that White (1989, p. 207) took: he
examined traveler’s checks in-depth, even despite their lack of practical impor-
tance to the money supply (to illustrate the principles involved). Conversely,
we will look at MMMFs precisely because of their growing importance to the
broader money supplies. Figure 1 below shows the growth of MMMFs as a
percentage of the broader money supply M2, contrasted with a reduction of
checkable deposits as a percentage of M2.
Figure 1
Percentage of M2
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WHAT ARE MONEY MARKET
 MUTUAL FUNDS?
While most readers are familiar with MMMFs, it may be useful to review what
they are and how they operate. An MMMF is an equity fund that typically
purchases highly liquid, high-quality, short-term debt instruments such as
T-Bills or commercial paper. A purchaser will transfer money balances to the
fund, which will purchase shares of the existing portfolio with a nominal par
value of one dollar. If the value of the portfolio changes, the number of shares
within an individual’s account will change to maintain the par value per share.
MMMFs do not have any established reserve requirements, but typically hold
a small amount on deposit with banks in the form of checkable deposits for
adverse clearings. Since they hold highly liquid assets, if their outflows exceed
their inflows, they can easily sell assets to replenish their cash reserves with
low transaction costs. In fact, MMMFs must sell assets in exchange for demand
deposits in this case, since that form is required by the ultimate recipient of an
MMMF check.3 Most MMMFs issue checkbooks and allow withdrawals, al-
though they typically must exceed a certain dollar amount. Purchasers sacri-
fice some liquidity (they can write checks only above a certain amount), but
have continuous access to their money. Checks drawn against MMMFs are
generally accepted anywhere demand deposit checks are accepted. Subjec-
tively, this asset appears to be a present good to those participants. Although
the MMMFs are not debt claims, but equity claims, the possibility of failure to
redeem is extremely remote, so much so that in practice MMMFs are usually
seen simply as another form of cash.4 MMMFs are an increasing part of
individuals’ portfolios, while reducing the requirement for narrower versions
of money. MMMFs are not insured by the federal government, however, but
most are insured by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) up
to $500,000 per customer, but this does not ensure redeemability at par.5
3I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to be more clear in this matter.
It is certainly true that the assets held in the MMMF are not money directly, but must be
converted into a narrower form in some market. The crucial point, however, is that this
conversion is virtually invisible to the market participants who write checks against their
MMMF accounts, as well as to those who accept them. This also legitimately implies that,
according to the same logic, as the referee points out—other funds that issue check-writing
privileges could be considered “money.” I would agree when and if market participants
subjectively assess them as they do MMMFs—but, given their less certain redemption at
par and low relative usage, this does not seem germane just yet.
4To my knowledge, there has only been one failure of an MMMF, and it paid something
over ninety cents to the dollar.
5See http://www.sipc.org/faq/content/faq1.shtml, however it explicitly states “An
investment in mutual fund shares, including money market mutual fund shares, is not
protected or guaranteed by SIPC against loss in value.”
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ARE MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS MONEY?
This issue has recently become a point of debate between two financial market
participants6 who both claim to analyze money from an Austrian perspec-
tive. Frank Shostak (former chief economist for Ord Minnett), claims that
MMMFs are not money, for to create shares in an MMMF, someone must
first surrender real money (2000a). Accordingly, creation of MMMFs is a
credit transaction, not a money creation. Doug Noland (financial market
strategist for David Tice and Associates) asserts just the opposite—that
growth in MMMFs is the outward manifestation of a dangerous credit
bubble. He argues that MMMFs possess the widow’s cruse, and can infi-
nitely multiply deposits as the financial system requires. (While outside the
traditional academic mainstream, we should seriously c onsider market par-
ticipants’ claims since they put more on the line than their academic reputa-
tions.)
WHY THE CONCERN OVER MONEY?
While seemingly obvious, the answer to this question will help us understand
which assets should be considered money. Central to our review will be an
application to MMMFs of concepts from Mises’s The Theory of Money and Credit.
Mises addressed this question as follows:
In attempting to draw a line of division between money and those objects that
outwardly resemble it, we only need to bear in mind the goal of our investiga-
tion. The present discussion aims at tracing the laws that determine the
exchange ratio between money and other economic goods. This and nothing
else is the task of the economic theory of money. (1981, p. 65)
We therefore ask what is money because of the way certain assets and claims
influence its price relative to all other goods. As will be discussed below, Mises
shows how some assets that are not money proper but substitutes for it can
influence the price level. These same money substitutes, while disturbing the
objective exchange value of money, also disturb relative prices of nonmone-
tary goods as the introduction of new “money” necessarily affects the prices of
some goods prior to others. These relative price disturbances send false signals
to economic actors concerning consumer preferences, leading to malinvest-
ments. As the introduction of the new money works its way through the
economy, all prices will readjust to reflect true consumer preferences, reveal-
ing the bad investments—the boom is thus followed by a bust. This boom-and-
bust business cycle caused by monetary policy is the second reason for being
6See Noland (2000b). Many of his commentaries for the first quarter 2000 deal with this
subject, and are archived at www.prudentbear.com.
56 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS VOL. 3, NO. 4 (WINTER 2000)
concerned with money—the inflation we were originally concerned with is
also a source of economic instability. 
While acknowledging the technical and legal requirements for money, the
important consideration for Mises was the actual economic effect of an instru-
ment. As he notes, “it is not the formal technical aspect of a transaction but its
economic character that determines its significance for us” (1981, p. 303).
Further, “It is a mistake to deal with economic problems according to legal
criteria” (p. 73). He also stresses that individual subjective valuations will
determine the moneyness of an object—an individual treating and accepting
an object as money carries more weight than some technical justification. 
[I]t is not the dead letter of the law so much as actual business practice
that counts, so that some things function as fiduciary media, although
they cannot be regarded as promises to pay money from the juristic
point of view, because they nevertheless are in fact honored as such by
somebody or the other. (1981, p. 311)
While disagreeing with this paper’s conclusion regarding MMMFs,
Salerno, Rothbard, and White share the belief that an asset’s function deter-
mines its moneyness. Salerno applies this logic to savings deposits:
The objection that claims on dollars held in savings deposits typically
do not circulate in exchange . . . while not unimportant for some
purposes of analysis, is here beside the point. The essential, economic
point is that some or all of the dollars accumulated in, e.g., passbook
savings accounts are effectively withdrawable on demand by deposi-
tors in the form of spendable cash. (1987, p. 3)
Salerno credits this “commonsense” approach to Melchior Palyi, who stated
“In their own minds, money is what people consider as purchasing power,
available at once or shortly. People’s ’liquidity’ status and financial disposition
are not affected by juristic subtleties and technicalities.”7 Rothbard uses this
approach to illustrate the moneyness of checkable deposits. 
It is important to recognize that demand deposits are not automatically
part of the money supply by virtue of their very existence; they con-
tinue as equivalent to money only so long as the subjective estimates of
the sellers of goods on the market think that they are so equivalent and
accept them as such in exchange. (1978, p. 145) 
Rothbard also says that it is not a question of whether an asset can actually
deliver on its promises (i.e., fractional reserve banking ensures that not all
7Quoted in Salerno (1987, p. 3).
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claims for cash can be simultaneously satisfied), but the issue depends on the
subjective estimates of the agents.
Deposits are not in fact all redeemable in cash in a system of fractional reserve
banking; but so long as individuals on the market think that they are so redeem-
able, they continue to function as part of the money supply. (1978, p. 145)
White also endorses this view. He (1989, p. 203) states, “From a subjectivist
perspective, it is clear that the defining set of attributes of money is to be sought
in the role that money plays (and alone plays) in the plans of individual economic
agents.” Salerno’s “commonsense” approach will often be applied in subsequent
sections as we argue that, in fact, MMMFs act as money in today’s econ-
omy—both from an inflationary and a malinvestment perspective.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST MMMFS BEING MONEY
The debate over what constitutes money is not new, and there are probably as
many different opinions as there are economists. Many of the important argu-
ments over economic policy have arisen from disagreements over money—in
one case, the Currency School was rejected because of its failure to understand
that checkable deposits were as much money as banknotes (Mises 1981, pp.
407–11). In some cases, the debate is over no opinion: Alan Greenspan recently
suggested that the Fed does not know what money is, so its control thereof is
impossible.8 In contrast, Rothbard, Salerno, and White have addressed this
question from an Austrian perspective, offering methodology to characterize
money.9 Yet all are in agreement that MMMFs are not money. As White notes
(and Salerno references in agreement), 
the item that the check-writing MMMF customer relinquishes (ownership of
shares in a portfolio of assets) is not what the payee accepts (ownership of an
inside-money claim to bank reserves). Because the actual MMMF shares are
not what the second party accepts (or intends to accept), MMMF shares cannot
be considered a generally accepted medium of exchange; hence they are not
money. (1989, p. 213)
The first objection, therefore, is,
1. Technical considerations dictate that MMMFs cannot be money. One
cannot call an asset generally accepted if what one party accepts is not what the
other party relinquishes. 
8Greenspan made this point during his Humphrey–Hawkins testimony of February
2000, when Congressman Ron Paul challenged him on the need to restrict money growth. I
am unable to document this directly, although Shostak discusses it in “The System of  the
Money Supply” (2000b).
9See Rothbard (1978, pp. 143–56), Salerno (1987, pp. 1–6), and White (1989, pp. 203–14).
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Is this true? And, if it is, does this technical consideration overcome the
practical functionality of MMMFs as an economic instrument? The previous
quotations from Austrians, including White, suggest just the opposite. It is true
that what one person offers in exchange is not what the other party wishes to
receive. But if an individual accepts a draft on a MMMF and deposits it with his
bank, which credits his account after it clears, this process is exactly the same as
that for a checkable deposit. For economic purposes, they are identical. If there
were differences in probability of payoff, a businesswoman might cast a more
suspicious eye toward an MMMF draft. But, given their record, this is not a
practical consideration.
When Osborne reviewed the question of what money is, he came to a
narrow conclusion: only the monetary base can be considered money (1985,
pp. 1–15). He founded this claim on three propositions: first, that money must
enjoy routine circulation (i.e., be the medium of exchange). Second, that there is
simultaneity of payments—“money is that, the entire stock of which can be spent
at once.” Third, that there be finality of payment: “money is that which pays for
goods or services without creating a further debt for the payer” (p. 1). This may
be an appropriate methodology when narrowly defining money, but even
Osborne doubts it. He points out his own regrettable implications as follows,
Our present analysis forces us to identify private bank notes as money
even though they are economically indistinguishable from intangible
balances. This unacceptable result proves the incompleteness of our
definition of money. (1985, p. 14)
Osborne’s definition raises a second objection where MMMFs are concerned.
2. Only the narrow monetary base meets the Yeager–Shackle requirements
of routine circulation, simultaneity, and finality.
For our purposes, though, this addresses only half the problem. Money is
of interest precisely because of its potential mischief in exchange (by its
changing objective exchange value because of inflation or deflation) and
possible business-cycle implications. But these considerations are not unique to
narrow money; one must also consider the state of money substitutes in an
economy—especially fiduciary media, which Mises refers to as circulation
credit. Mises introduced the ABCT by noting the ability of fiduciary media
expansion to initiate monetary disequilibrium. Thus, even if the objection is
correct, it is inapplicable to traditional Austrian concerns over money.
Shostak offers a different critique of MMMFs as money, he makes the
distinction between MMMFs as credit transactions and as credit creation. As
he states,
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Let’s say Joe deposits $1 million with a money-market mutual fund. A mort-
gage supplier borrows the $1 million from the mutual fund and lends it to
Jane, who in turn uses the $1 million to buy a house. The recipient of the $1
million, i.e., the seller of the house, deposits the money with a money-market
mutual fund.
     Has the economy’s money supply increased by $1 million? Not at all. What
we have here is a credit transaction, money transferred from a lender to a
borrower. Credit always involves the purchase of a future good by the creditor
in exchange for a present good. 
      Thus when Joe makes a loan to Jane, he temporarily transfers his ownership
over the money. Similarly, when Joe invests in a stock or a money-market
mutual fund, he gives permission to these institutions to invest his money. He
has temporarily transferred the ownership of money to these institutions.
     Since a credit transaction is a transfer of saved funds from a lender to a
borrower it does not result in the creation of new money, but simply new
credit. This credit, however, is not harmful, for it is fully backed by saved
money. (Shostak 2000a, p. 1)
3. A third objection, then, runs as follows: the purchase of MMMFs consti-
tutes a credit transaction, not credit creation.
But in Shostak’s example, has Joe really given up control of his money? If
so, has he agreed to give it up for the period of time for which it is loaned out?
Certainly not. If Joe sees an asset he wants to purchase, say a new car, he will not
be the least concerned with whether his original money is loaned out somewhere
else: he will simply open his MMMF checkbook and write the check. Were this
liquidity not available, he likely would never have deposited his money with an
MMMF. Once again, technical considerations do not outweigh the practical use of
this instrument. Shostak would be correct if Joe were truly surrendering control
over this present good. But he has no such intent. If he did, he would purchase the
mortgage directly and obtain the higher yield. He is willing to accept the lower
yield for the right to enjoy ownership of what he correctly considers a present
good. In addition, this discussion doesn’t address the possibility of MMMF
multiple deposit expansion, which is reviewed below.
4. MMMFs are equity claims, not debt, so they can’t represent any given
amount.
Once again, this is a technical consideration (discussed more thoroughly
below), which, while true, does not have practical significance. If, historically,
there were more instances of MMMF failures that resulted in losses, this would
be more relevant. But, given the low failure rate, it seems reasonable for people
to believe that the shares they redeem will be at par. 
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WHY MMMFS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED MONEY
In Ludwig von Mises’s The Theory of Money and Credit, Appendix B offered the
following taxonomy to describe money.
Clearly, MMMFs do not fall under the category of money in the narrower
sense. But are they a type of fiduciary media? For Mises, money substitutes are
“those objects that are employed like money in commerce but consist in per-
fectly secure and immediately convertible claims to money”(1981, p. 65). But as
noted previously, these characteristics are subjectively evaluated. Consumers
today seem to find a money-market fund as secure as a check, as do producers.
No one could argue that they are perfectly secure, but one can make the case
that they are as secure as checks, which are readily acknowledged as money.10
Mises expands on this definition of perfectly safe, noting that “(money substi-
tutes) are . . . absolutely safe as far as human foresight goes” (1981, p. 66). This
seems a slightly less stringent requirement than “perfectly secure,” and one
that MMMFs have demonstrated throughout their history. They are also im-
mediately convertible (subject to the minimum withdrawal amount) when
used as a check. MMMFs thus seem to meet Mises’s two requirements of
money substitutes practically, if not juristically. As Mises again, states,
A depositor of a sum of money who acquires in exchange for it a claim
convertible into money at any time which will perform exactly the same
service for him as the sum it refers to, has exchanged no present good
for a future good. The claim that he has acquired by his deposit is also a
present good for him. The depositing of the money in no way means that
10It is true that checks are guaranteed by the FDIC whereas MMMFs are not, but in
today’s environment of “too big to fail” and government bailout of any financial flop that
threatens systemic crisis, is it reasonable to think the government would step in in the case
of a large MMMF failure?
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he has renounced immediate disposal over the utility that it commands. (1981,
p. 301)
If this is true, what type of money substitutes are MMMFs? They seem to
fall under the category of fiduciary media,  money substitutes not fully backed
by money for redemption purposes (p. 155). Clearly MMMFs are not fully
backed, and, in fact, lack reserve requirements though they do keep certain
reserves available to meet redemption requirements.11
 As noted above, Mises considered the objective exchange value of money
to be the central economic problem of money. To what extent—if any—do
MMMFs change the objective value of money? For Mises (1963, p. 411), this  is
determined by the interaction of supply and demand for money, broadly
defined (i.e., including money substitutes). MMMFs affect this money relation
in two ways: they reduce the demand for narrow money (currency and de-
mand deposits, as reflected in Figure 1) and they increase the supply of broad
money. Both of these factors tend to reduce the objective exchange value of
money, ceteris paribus. As Mises states,
The cash balance held by an individual need by no means consist entirely of
money. If secure claims to money, payable on demand, are employed com-
mercially as substitutes for money, being tendered and accepted in place of
money, then individuals’ stores of money can be entirely or partly replaced by
a corresponding store of these substitutes. (1981, p. 154)
As argued above, all of these features are subjectively inherent to MMMFs,
which allows a reduction of narrow money balances.12
MMMF MULTIPLICATION
According to Austrian theory the ability of banks to issue fiduciary media has
been the source of both inflation and business cycles. Banks create loans on the
asset side of their balance sheets while adding checkable deposits on the
liability side. The checkable deposits represent a claim on, without the saving
of, present goods, based on a promise to pay back future goods. Without new
present goods, the issue of further claims against present goods is necessarily
11This amount obviously depends on each institution, but some sources estimate that
MMMFs keep roughly one-half of one percent available for redemption.
12As an anonymous referee points out, for the previous analysis to be true, MMMFs
cannot be perfect substitutes; otherwise, MMMFs could only work through the supply side,
not the demand side. While perhaps not as clear as I would like, the reference to Mises’s
distinctions between broad and narrow money is an attempt to show that, despite the fact
that MMMFs and narrow money are imperfect substitutes, MMMFs nonetheless can influ-
ence the critical monetary question—the exchange value between money and other eco-
nomic goods. I in no way want to suggest that they are perfect substitutes (especially since
the act of choice illustrates the fact that there can be no such thing as “perfect” substitutes).
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inflationary. And, according to Austrian theory, the increase in fiduciary
media lowers the market rate of interest below the natural rate of interest,
giving entrepreneurs false incentives to invest in higher order goods, which
lead to malinvestment. The initial boom (due to the increase in fiduciary
media) will inevitably lead to a bust, for increased investment cannot be
sustained in the absence of a change in consumer preferences. The process of
money creation can be found in any macroeconomics or money and banking
textbook. An individual bank could not expand the money supply inde-
pendent of the expansionary actions of other banks: as one bank issued check-
able deposits at a rate greater than that of its competitors, it would suffer
adverse clearings, lose reserves, and be forced to pull back on its expansionary
efforts. If, however, all banks were issuing new fiduciary media at the same
high rate, no adverse clearings would take place.13 In the face of reserve
requirements, money multiplication could take place up to the inverse of the
reserve requirements. In actual practice, money multiplication is much less
than this, as “leakage” occurs. This leakage can occur as either the bank decides
to maintain excess reserves or as the public demands additional currency. But
if MMMFs are money, how do they fit into this multiplication scheme?
MMMFs have no statutory reserve requirements, so, theoretically, they
could expand their balance sheets infinitely. Let’s review one possible sce-
nario. If Bill deposits one million dollars with Vanguard money market mutual
fund, Vanguard can purchase one million dollars of GE’s commercial paper.
GE can spend this money on anything it wants, but let’s say they use it to
finance car loans. If all car dealers deposit this money into their own MMMFs
(say Fidelity MMMF), the process can continue. Fidelity then uses the one
million dollars to purchase mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae, who
then uses the sum to purchase more mortgages. This money will go ultimately
to sellers of home equity (either direct sales or refinances). If these individuals
deposit it directly into Schwab’s MMMF, then more commercial paper is
bought, and more spending can occur throughout the economy. Theoretically,
this could lead to infinite expansion—if no leakage occurs. Leakage occurs
when the recipient of newly created credit demands a form of money, nar-
rower than that offered. In the case of MMMFs, the chance of leakage seems
greater than for checkable deposits; they could leak into demands not only for
currency or excess reserves, but for checkable deposits themselves. The whole
point of MMMFs is their liquidity, coupled with higher interest rates than
13As Selgin (1988) points out, however, when gross clearings increase, the probability
of insufficient reserves increases, thus providing a natural limit to the expansionary capa-
bilities of the whole system. This natural limitation is obviated with a central bank lender of
last resort, thus greatly increasing the possible inflationary expansion.
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those of checking accounts. Clearly, many consumers are going to redeem
them and the multiplication process will fall far short of infinite. In fact, as the
redemption process occurs, multiple deposit contraction will take place, just as
it does in the banking system when individuals demand cash from their
checking accounts. 
Nonetheless, the expansion of MMMF balance sheets is inflationary since
more claims to present goods are created without any abstention of claims to
present goods. Many commentators have argued that credit is only created by
the Federal Reserve. This is not strictly true as the above discussion demon-
strates. One should say, rather, that the Federal Reserve is responsible for the
initiation of all credit booms. In our example above, Bill originally received one
million dollars that was the result of the Fed’s money creation process. But,
once it is initiated, the Fed cannot control how this credit will multiply
throughout the system, especially when there are no statutory reserve require-
ments. But this is really no different than what happens with credit creation via
the banking system. The Fed supplies reserves, then the banking system and
the public’s decisions regarding excess reserves and currency requirements
dictate the actual money created. It is true that, ultimately, one can lay the
blame for excess credit creation at the Fed’s feet, for they must supply all
reserves (both for the banking system and MMMFs). But it is also true that
the control of money is difficult enough (in a fractional reserve system) in
the banking system (especially during the short run), and much more diffi-
cult with nonbank financial intermediaries (due to lack of reserve require-
ments).
As discussed earlier, some analysts like to separate MMMFs from the
banking system because they are equity claims instead of debt claims. If
everyone tried to redeem MMMFs for cash, MMMFs would be forced to
liquidate their assets, ultimately leaving the holders with less than par value.
This is the same situation that occurs for the banking industry without a lender
of last resort, if holders of checkable deposits demand cash. Loans have to be
liquidated at fire sale losses, and banks would have to declare bankruptcy. The
only difference is that the MMMF would not have to declare bankruptcy, for
holders of these funds are residual claimants. The banking system overcame this
problem upon creation of the Federal Reserve and FDIC insurance, which the
MMMF industry does not have. But, as White argues, countries with loosely
regulated free banking did not experience the sort of banking panics seen in the
U.S. (1999, pp. 69–73). This suggests that private markets can devise run-proof
institutional arrangements. Cowen and Krozner argue that the residual claim-
ant status itself makes MMMFs inherently run-proof (1990, pp. 225–28). As
mentioned previously, this technical distinction isn’t economically meaningful,
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as both holders of MMMFs and acceptors of MMMF checks treat them as
virtually identical to checkable deposits. And, as most Austrians agree, the
appropriate test is how an asset functions economically. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A traditional concern of many Austrians is the practice of fractional reserve
banking.14 They hold that fractional reserve banking as an institution is re-
sponsible for all inflations and the boom–bust cycle itself. The central bank is
not the primary, but rather a secondary problem because it is only through
central banks that fractional reserve banking, with the effective “cartelization”
of private banks, can survive and flourish (Rothbard 1994, pp. 54–69). But if the
analysis above is correct, even if we were to have a one-hundred-percent
reserve gold standard, we could still have potential inflation and business
cycles with creation of money substitutes such as MMMFs. As monetary
innovation has occurred, fractional reserve banking is no longer the only
potential source of mischief.15 Implicit government guarantees are also re-
sponsible, for it especially considering the recent experience of “too big to fail.”
One has to wonder if people would be as willing to accept MMMFs as a money
substitute if the government were not there to resolve every crisis and add to the
moral hazard problem. Just as Garrison (1994) expanded ABCT to include risk
transfer via FDIC guarantees, the moral hazard “bubble” created by the IMF
and other agency bailouts may be another potential manifestation of ABCT.
The willingness of individuals to hold less liquid forms of money may simply
reflect this change.
The implications of this are clear. Austrians should be concerned about the
growth of MMMFs. They can be inflationary, and Austrian theory provides a
unique perspective to assess their growth. Austrians are virtually alone among
current theorists in that they discuss the distributional aspects of infla-
tion—money is not neutral, because it is created and injected in a certain place
and time. Not all goods see the effects of inflation equally. When new money is
created by banking loans, the items purchased with the newly created check-
able deposits will see their prices rise first (Cantillon effects). As money for
those goods is subsequently spent, the inflation will pass from good to good.
Only in the long run will the inflation be seen throughout the system. But
money is not neutral, even in the long run, as those who were able to spend it
14See for example, Rothbard 1994. This concern has been contrasted by other Austrians,
such as Selgin and White 1996, who are more concerned with the institution of central bank-
ing itself.
15Given the reasons for much of the financial innovation (i.e., to avoid the effects of
inflation), one naturally wonders how the course of innovation would have progressed
absent fractional reserve banking.
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first benefited at the expense of those who received it last. In standard Austrian
theory, the producer’s goods purchased first will be the first to see the inflation,
and only in the end will it spread throughout the consumer’s goods.
With the Austrian perspective, one can ask the question: which prices will
rise first as a result of the money creation process inherent to MMMFs? In the
case of MMMFs, the money goes first to the sellers of the highly liquid debt
instruments (usually commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, and T-
bills). Figure 2 below suggests that there may be a relationship between
MMMFs and the explosive growth in the balance sheets of government spon-
sored-enterprises (GSEs), as Noland (2000a) suggests.
Unfortunately, there are no detailed aggregate statistics available on the
overall composition of MMMF assets (when we aggregate as Hayek suggests,
we lose the very granularity needed to assess), although individual MMMF
balance sheets are available. But if MMMFs invest in mortgages and the
commercial paper of Wall Street firms (they do, the only question is the
degree), then Austrian theory suggests that growth in this form of fiduciary
media would initially lead to inflated asset prices and a subsequent rise in
consumer prices. This issue should be explored further.
In addition, if GSEs account for such a large part of the MMMF increase,
what role does their implicit U.S. government guarantee play in the expansion
of their balance sheets? Treasury Undersecretary Gensler recently noted that
“The advantages of GSE status have also enabled the GSEs to grow rapidly and
gain an increasing share of the capital markets. The GSEs now control a central
position in the mortgage market and an increasing share of the U.S. debt
Figure 2
MMMF and GSE Growth
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markets.”16 These advantages have led to their dominance in capital markets.
The large increases over the last two years are clearly becoming a significant
issue: 
The $1.4 trillion of GSE debt is large on any relative scale. It is now
roughly the size of the entire municipal bond market—the outstanding
debt of the fifty states and localities that issue publicly traded debt. The
GSEs’ debt of $1.4 trillion is now more than one-half of the $2.7 trillion
of outstanding privately held marketable Treasury debt. Adding the
$1.2 trillion in GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities to the mix,
GSE involvement in the credit market is approaching the size of the
Treasury market. (Gensler 2000, p. 3)
ABCT depends on the government’s central bank sending entrepreneurs
false signals regarding the time preferences of consumers. Are GSEs, through
their implicit government guarantees, able to expand their balance sheets in
excess of what the market would do? The GSE status allows them less expen-
sive capital as well. As Gensler notes, “Over the last six months, the GSEs
borrowed at approximately 40 basis points less than AA-rated banking and
financial firms on one- and five-year debt.”17 Does the lower cost of mortgages
result in malinvestment and inflation in the housing market? These are all
questions to consider once we determine that MMMFs are money.
CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years, continual financial innovation has led to the increased
use of MMMFs as a substitute for checkable deposits. While many technical
considerations suggest that it is inappropriate to list MMMFs as money, tradi-
tional Austrian thought has emphasized money’s subjective aspects: money is
what people think it is. Since the public increasingly uses MMMFs as money
substitutes, they are money in all practical respects. Every technical consideration
that would restrict the use of MMMFs as a type of money thus crashes against the
rocks of practical, everyday experience. 
While nonbank financial intermediaries can expand this type of money sub-
stitute, the Federal Reserve must still provide initial credit for any multiplication
to take place. These nonbanks are even more difficult for the Fed to control, for
they face no reserve requirements. But, on the other hand, there are more
opportunities for leakage from the system, thereby limiting potential credit
expansion. Nonetheless, this is an aspect of money that is becoming increas-
ingly important. And if, as seems likely, MMMF expansion stimulates different
16See Gensler’s (2000, p. 3) testimony to the House Banking Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Securities and Government Sp onsored Enterprises.
17Ibid., p. 2.
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sectors of the economy than the banking system generally, we should expect to
see monetary inflation manifest itself in different ways than previous infla-
tions.
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